Tuesday, May 22, 2012

Court reviews whether an employer breached its fiduciary duty to a former employee

BETH PROFFITT v. SMOKY MOUNTAIN WOODCARVERS SUPPLY, INC., ET AL. (Tenn. Ct. App. May 15, 2012)

This appeal arises from the termination of Beth Proffitt (“Plaintiff”) from employment at Smoky Mountain Woodcarvers Supply, Inc. (“the Corporation”). Plaintiff, a minority shareholder in the Corporation, sued the Corporation, as well as the other shareholders Mac Proffitt and Ray Proffitt (collectively, “the Defendants”) in the Circuit Court for Blount County (“the Trial Court”). The Trial Court bifurcated the issues of liability and damages.

Plaintiff alleged, among other things, that the Defendants breached their fiduciary duty to her. After a trial on the matter of liability, the Trial Court found the Defendants liable for breach of fiduciary duty. After the hearing on damages, the Trial Court awarded damages to Plaintiff, including lost salary and bonus. The Trial Court also awarded Plaintiff her attorney’s fees. The Defendants appeal.

We find that the Trial Court did not err in finding that the Defendants did breach their fiduciary duty to Plaintiff. We, however, reverse the award of attorney’s fees to Plaintiff. Otherwise, we affirm the judgment of the Trial Court.

Opinion available at:
https://www.tba.org/sites/default/files/proffittb_051512.pdf

Friday, May 4, 2012

Court reviews whether a farmer can be considered a merchant for the purposes of the UCC Statute of Frauds

BROOKS COTTON COMPANY, INC. v. BRADLEY F. WILLIAMS (Tenn. Ct. App. April 23, 2012)

This interlocutory appeal concerns the question of whether a farmer may be considered a merchant for purposes of the Uniform Commercial Code Statute of Frauds.

Appellant farmer allegedly entered into an oral contract to sell his cotton crop to Appellee cotton company. The farmer failed to deliver the cotton and the cotton company sued for specific performance. The farmer defended the suit by arguing that the alleged oral contract was unenforceable due to the Statute of Frauds. The cotton company countered that the farmer was a merchant for purposes of the merchant exception to the Statute of Frauds. The trial court granted partial summary judgment in favor of the cotton company, finding that the farmer was a merchant for purposes of the Statute of Frauds.

We hold that a farmer may be considered a merchant for purposes of the Uniform Commercial Code Statute of Frauds, the determination of which is a mixed question of law and fact. However, because the question of whether this particular farmer qualifies as a merchant raises genuine issues regarding the inferences to be drawn from the facts, we reverse the grant of partial summary judgment and remand to the trial court for a trial on the merits.

Opinion available at:
https://www.tba.org/sites/default/files/brookscotton_042312.pdf