The Red Rabbit Kitchen and Bar in Sacramento, Calif. — whose co-owners include Matt Nurge, left, and John Bays — was the apparent target of an alleged extortion attempt by a Yelp user. (Paul Kitagaki Jr., Sacramento Bee/MCT)
Restaurant co-owner Sonny Mayugba was given an offer he almost could not refuse last month. Not by a local gangster but by a user of the popular online-review site Yelp.com. Mayugba said the user threatened to blast Red Rabbit Kitchen and Bar in Sacramento, which Mayugba co-owns, on Yelp because he believed he and his party got food poisoning from their meals.
Read the full story at the Denver Post's website: http://www.denverpost.com/business/ci_20763457/restaurants-say-online-reviewers-may-exploit-their-power#ixzz1wvTS6Lqh
Friday, June 22, 2012
Wednesday, June 20, 2012
Penalties vary for companies convicted of crimes
Brian Wanamaker is a criminal defense attorney with Ritchie, Dillard, Davies & Johnson. This column is provided through the Knoxville Bar Association.
Most companies expect the occasional civil judgment or fine; they rarely expect to plead guilty to a criminal offense. Global health care company Abbott Laboratories Inc. recently agreed to do just that to resolve civil and criminal liability issues related to off-label marketing of its anti-seizure medication Depakote. Abbott agreed to plead guilty to one misdemeanor and pay about $1.6 billion. That is one hefty misdemeanor.
Read the full story at:
http://www.knoxnews.com/news/2012/jun/04/penalties-vary-for-companies-convicted-of-crimes/
Most companies expect the occasional civil judgment or fine; they rarely expect to plead guilty to a criminal offense. Global health care company Abbott Laboratories Inc. recently agreed to do just that to resolve civil and criminal liability issues related to off-label marketing of its anti-seizure medication Depakote. Abbott agreed to plead guilty to one misdemeanor and pay about $1.6 billion. That is one hefty misdemeanor.
Read the full story at:
http://www.knoxnews.com/news/2012/jun/04/penalties-vary-for-companies-convicted-of-crimes/
Court reviews whether members of a partnership could be held individually liable for a mortgage loan
BEACH COMMUNITY BANK v. EDWARD A. LABRY, III, ET AL. (Tenn. Ct. App. June 15, 2012)
This case involves personal guaranties on a loan to purchase real estate. The Appellants entered into a partnership for the purpose of buying and selling real estate. The partnership obtained a loan in the amount of $2,611,000.00 to purchase real property located in Florida. The Appellants each signed a personal guaranty on the loan in favor of the Appellee bank. By the express terms of the guaranties, the Appellants guaranteed “up to a principle amount of $795,600.00.”
The partnership defaulted on the loan and the bank sued to enforce the guaranties. The Appellants answered that the guaranties were joint and several and that, because they were only 30% owners of the partnership, they could only be liable for 30% of the amount of the defaulted loan. In addition, the Appellants argued that the bank breached the covenant of good faith in failing to foreclose on the subject property.
The trial court found that, under Florida law, the guaranties were not ambiguous, but were separate guaranties holding each Appellant separately liable for $795,600.00. The trial court also awarded interest on the entire debt.
We affirm the trial court’s determination that the guaranties unambiguously require each Appellant to be separately liable for $795,600.00, but hold that the term regarding interest is ambiguous. Accordingly, we reverse the grant of summary judgment on this issue and remand to the trial court for the consideration of parole evidence regarding the amount of interest and fees chargeable to the Appellants. Affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded.
Opinion available at:
https://www.tba.org/sites/default/files/beachbank_061512.pdf
This case involves personal guaranties on a loan to purchase real estate. The Appellants entered into a partnership for the purpose of buying and selling real estate. The partnership obtained a loan in the amount of $2,611,000.00 to purchase real property located in Florida. The Appellants each signed a personal guaranty on the loan in favor of the Appellee bank. By the express terms of the guaranties, the Appellants guaranteed “up to a principle amount of $795,600.00.”
The partnership defaulted on the loan and the bank sued to enforce the guaranties. The Appellants answered that the guaranties were joint and several and that, because they were only 30% owners of the partnership, they could only be liable for 30% of the amount of the defaulted loan. In addition, the Appellants argued that the bank breached the covenant of good faith in failing to foreclose on the subject property.
The trial court found that, under Florida law, the guaranties were not ambiguous, but were separate guaranties holding each Appellant separately liable for $795,600.00. The trial court also awarded interest on the entire debt.
We affirm the trial court’s determination that the guaranties unambiguously require each Appellant to be separately liable for $795,600.00, but hold that the term regarding interest is ambiguous. Accordingly, we reverse the grant of summary judgment on this issue and remand to the trial court for the consideration of parole evidence regarding the amount of interest and fees chargeable to the Appellants. Affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded.
Opinion available at:
https://www.tba.org/sites/default/files/beachbank_061512.pdf
Saturday, June 2, 2012
Tennessee Supreme Court reviews whether a plaintiff's injuries in a bar are covered by liability insurance
DONNA CLARK v. SPUTNIKS, LLC ET AL. AND LEONARD GAMBLE v. SPUTNIKS, LLC ET AL. (Tenn. May 30, 2012)
In these consolidated cases, the primary issue is whether there is liability insurance coverage for the plaintiffs’ injuries resulting from an altercation on the premises of the insured’s bar and restaurant. The insurer denied coverage and declined to defend the insured based on its determination that there was no coverage under the terms of the policy.
We hold that based on the clear terms of the policy agreement, there is no liability coverage because the incident arose from an assault and battery, which was an excluded cause, and because there is no nonexcluded concurrent cause to provide coverage. We further hold that estoppel by judgment does not apply to collaterally estop the insurer from arguing the lack of coverage. The judgment of the trial court is reversed.
Opinion available at:
https://www.tba.org/sites/default/files/gamble_053012.pdf
In these consolidated cases, the primary issue is whether there is liability insurance coverage for the plaintiffs’ injuries resulting from an altercation on the premises of the insured’s bar and restaurant. The insurer denied coverage and declined to defend the insured based on its determination that there was no coverage under the terms of the policy.
We hold that based on the clear terms of the policy agreement, there is no liability coverage because the incident arose from an assault and battery, which was an excluded cause, and because there is no nonexcluded concurrent cause to provide coverage. We further hold that estoppel by judgment does not apply to collaterally estop the insurer from arguing the lack of coverage. The judgment of the trial court is reversed.
Opinion available at:
https://www.tba.org/sites/default/files/gamble_053012.pdf
Court reviews whether Plaintiff was an at-will employee eligible to sue for retaliatory discharge
CAROL PETSCHONEK v. THE CATHOLIC DIOCESE OF MEMPHIS, ET AL. (Tenn. Ct. App. May 23, 2012)
Defendant employer moved for summary judgment in this common law retaliatory discharge action on the grounds that Plaintiff employee was not an employee-at-will and that Plaintiff had failed to identify any law or clear public policy allegedly violated by Defendant. The trial court denied the motion.
We granted permission for interlocutory appeal. On appeal, Defendant raises the issue of whether the courts lack jurisdiction under the ministerial exception. We hold that the court has subject matter jurisdiction. We also hold that Plaintiff was not an at-will employee, and therefore cannot establish a prima facie case of common law retaliatory discharge. The trial court’s judgment denying Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is reversed.
Opinion available at:
https://www.tba.org/sites/default/files/petschonekc_052312_0.pdf
Concurring opinion:
https://www.tba.org/sites/default/files/petschonekc_CON_052312_0.pdf
Defendant employer moved for summary judgment in this common law retaliatory discharge action on the grounds that Plaintiff employee was not an employee-at-will and that Plaintiff had failed to identify any law or clear public policy allegedly violated by Defendant. The trial court denied the motion.
We granted permission for interlocutory appeal. On appeal, Defendant raises the issue of whether the courts lack jurisdiction under the ministerial exception. We hold that the court has subject matter jurisdiction. We also hold that Plaintiff was not an at-will employee, and therefore cannot establish a prima facie case of common law retaliatory discharge. The trial court’s judgment denying Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is reversed.
Opinion available at:
https://www.tba.org/sites/default/files/petschonekc_052312_0.pdf
Concurring opinion:
https://www.tba.org/sites/default/files/petschonekc_CON_052312_0.pdf
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